The
Hypothesis
Same bet. Different source. If you see the exact same probabilities in both games, any difference in behaviour must come from who is on the other side, not from the maths.
The innovation: an inverted Trust Game
The Trust Game of Berg et al. (1995) has a problem: you don't know the probabilities. You just know someone could betray you. That's second-order risk, uncertainty about uncertainty.
Our modification gives you explicit probabilities. First-order risk. You see exactly what could happen and how likely it is. The only question: is it a person behind that probability, or a lottery?
- 01Invest with Player KV, a previous participant
- 02The amount is multiplied
- 03You see the probability that KV returns money, based on their past behaviour
- 01Invest in a lottery
- 02The amount is multiplied
- 03You see the same probability, determined by the lottery
Identical probabilities, stakes and structure
The same 200 trials are played in both conditions. Only the framing differs: a previous participant's behaviour, or a lottery. If Prospect Theory parameters differ, it is because social context changes how you process risk.
What we're testing: twenty candidate models
Cumulative Prospect Theory has two families of parameters. Value weighting: α (outcome sensitivity) and λ (loss aversion). Probability weighting: γ+ for gains and γ− for losses.
We fit twenty models per participant: sixteen nested Prospect Theory variants, one for each subset of {α, λ, γ+, γ−} allowed to differ between the social and the non-social condition, and four alternatives that are not Prospect Theory at all (expected utility, and three simple heuristics based on the probability, the gain or the loss alone)
The hypotheses are non-directional. H2 and H3 are only tested for the parameters that the winning model lets differ. The whole plan is preregistered on OSF.